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TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, VOTING RIGHTS, AND STRICT 
SCRUTINY 
HENRY L. CHAMBERS, JR.∗ 
ABSTRACT 
When technology obviates the need for an election law that prevents 
some otherwise eligible voters from casting a ballot, a jurisdiction’s reten-
tion of that law and refusal to adopt the technology should be deemed a se-
rious infringement of the right to vote that triggers strict scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 
INTRODUCTION 
When technological change and voting rights are mentioned together, 
the discussion often revolves around how ever more sophisticated software 
can be used to draw gerrymandered districts.1  That use of technology harms 
and dilutes voting rights by grouping voters into districts where one party’s 
candidates have little to no chance of winning (or losing) an election,2 leaving 
the other party’s voters virtually no chance of exercising the political power 
their numbers would suggest.3  Given our recent history regarding technol-
ogy and redistricting, the public could be excused for believing the primary 
use of technology in elections is to degrade voting rights and harm democ-
racy.4  However, contrary to its use to gerrymander, technology—including 
systems that help allow voters to register and vote on the Election Day—can 
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∗ Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law.  Thank you to all of the partici-
pants in the Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze for comments on the draft.  Thank you to 
Brooke Throckmorton and Zanas Talley for their excellent research assistance and input. 
 1.  See DAVID DALEY, RATF**KED: WHY YOUR VOTE DOES NOT COUNT (2016); Vann R. 
Newkirk, II, How Redistricting Became a Technological Arms Race, ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/gerrymandering-technology-redmap-
2020/543888/.   
 2.  For a recent example of racial gerrymandering, see Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Ala-
bama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).  
 3.  Proportional representation is not required under the Constitution.  See Henry L. Chambers, 
Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1440 (2002).  How-
ever, the intentional minimization of a political party’s power through gerrymandering arguably is 
unconstitutional, but not justiciable.  See Vieth v. Jubilerer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004); Davis v. 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118 (1986); see also Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926 (2018). 
 4.  For a discussion of gerrymandering’s effects, see Bertrall Ross, Partisan Gerrymandering, 
the First Amendment, and the Political Outsider, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2187 (2018).  
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be used to increase electoral fairness and enhance voting rights by making 
voting easier for individuals and making elections easier to manage.5  The 
aggressive use of technology can allow election officials to complete admin-
istrative tasks more quickly and accurately,6 eliminating the need for some 
election laws that delay a citizen’s ability to register to vote or stop eligible 
voters from casting ballots.7  When technology can make voting easier and 
more accessible, a state’s refusal to adopt such technology or jettison laws 
that restrict a voter’s ability to cast a ballot should trigger increasingly strict 
constitutional scrutiny. 
The Constitution does not explicitly grant the right to vote.8  However, 
the right to vote is protected as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause9 through a bifurcated structure.10  De-
nials of the right to vote and significant infringements on the right to vote 
tend to be subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that a state’s law be passed 
to further a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to infringe the 
right to vote as little as possible.11  Lesser infringements on the right to vote 
typically are subject to a balancing test that weighs the law’s infringement 
against the state’s interest in regulating elections or voting in general.12 
                                                        
 5.  See NATALIE ADONA ET AL., STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY: THE VIEWS OF AMERICAN 
LOCAL ELECTION OFFICIALS 32 (2019), https://www.democracyfund.org/media/up-
loaded/2019_DemocracyFund_StewardsOfDemocracy.pdf (“[Election officials] recognize that 
election reforms and technological changes, while creating short-term challenges, have improved 
the overall registration and voting experience—both for voters and for election officials them-
selves.”); U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING 
SURVEY: 2018 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, A REPORT TO THE 116TH CONGRESS 19 (2019) [herein-
after EAC REPORT], https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/2018_EAVS_Report.pdf  (noting use of elec-
tronic pollbooks for same-day voter registration and voting).  
 6.  Completing tasks more quickly can help shorten lines at polling places.  See Justin Levitt, 
“Fixing That”: Lines at the Polling Place, 28 J.L. & POL. 465, 470 (2013) (“The basic contours 
apply to lines at the polls just as they do to these other queues: . . . the longer each transaction, the 
longer the line.”).   
 7.  Registration and voting have become easier over time.  See ADONA, ET AL., supra note 5, 
at 5. 
 8.  See Richard Briffault, Three Questions for the “Right to Vote” Amendment, 23 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 27, 27 (2014) (noting lack of explicit right to vote in U.S. Constitution). 
 9.  See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Dred Scott: Tiered Citizenship and Tiered Personhood, 82 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 222 (2007); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Undue Burdens and Potential Op-
portunities in Voting Rights and Abortion Law, 93 IND. L.J. 139, 140 (2018) (“[T]he U.S. Consti-
tution confers few affirmative rights directly . . . .”).  
 10.  See Daniel P. Tokaji, Voting Is Association, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 777 (2016) (dis-
cussing use of balancing test or strict scrutiny depending on the level of infringement of the right to 
vote). 
 11.  See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).  For a discussion of how strict scrutiny 
intersects with the right to vote in the context of redistricting, see Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of 
Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017). 
 12.  See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190–
91 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
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Though technology might appear relevant only to whether a law should sur-
vive whichever test a court chooses to apply, technology should also be 
deemed relevant to the choice of which test to apply.  If technology ade-
quately addresses the administrative problem that arguably justifies a law that 
limits the voter’s ability to cast a ballot, the state’s refusal to adopt that tech-
nology and to retain the law should be deemed an intentional and significant 
infringement on the right to vote that must survive strict scrutiny. 
This Essay will proceed in three brief parts.  Part I will discuss how the 
Constitution regulates election laws and voting laws.  Part II will note three 
types of election laws whose need may be significantly lessened or com-
pletely eliminated through the use of technology.  Part III will consider 
whether technology’s ability to eliminate the need for a law that restricts a 
voter’s ability to vote or cast a ballot should subject a state’s continued use 
of the law to strict scrutiny rather than a balancing test. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
The right to vote is fundamental.13  The Fourteenth Amendment prohib-
its states from restricting the right to vote absent significant justification.14  
The more significantly a state restricts the right to vote, the more substantial 
the state’s justification for the restriction must be.15  An explicit denial of the 
right to vote, such as a state’s intentional and explicit exclusion of a voter 
from an electorate, will be subject to strict scrutiny.16  Similarly, an election 
or voting law that significantly burdens a voter’s right to vote generally must 
survive strict scrutiny.17  Laws that impose modest burdens on voters and 
their right to vote receive lesser scrutiny, and need only survive a balancing 
test that weighs the state’s interests in having the law against the burden the 
law places on the voter’s ability to vote.18  For example, a voter’s temporary 
                                                        
 13.  See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (treating the right to vote as 
fundamental); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[Voting] is regarded as a 
fundamental . . . right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.”). 
 14.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964). 
 15.  See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428; Karlan, supra note 9, at 146 (“Only if the burdens [on the 
right to vote] are ‘severe’ must the restriction be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of 
compelling importance.’  Otherwise, a state’s “‘important regulatory interests are generally suffi-
cient to justify” the restrictions.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 
(1992), and then quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983))). 
 16.  See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (applying 
strict scrutiny to voter’s exclusion from a school board electorate). 
 17.  See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (“Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected 
to ‘severe’ restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of com-
pelling importance.’” (quoting Reed, 502 U.S. at 289)). 
 18.  See Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 789 (noting that a court must weigh “the character and magni-
tude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the 
plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications 
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exclusion from the electorate due to the enforcement of a voter registration 
deadline or a voter’s inability to cast a ballot that is an incidental effect of a 
voter identification (“voter ID”) law, may be deemed a mild infringement on 
a voter’s right to vote.19  Each may merely be subject to the aforementioned 
balancing test. The Constitution protects a voter’s right to vote and oppor-
tunity to cast a ballot, but not absolutely against all restrictions.20 
Fifty years ago, in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,21 the 
Supreme Court determined that strict scrutiny applies to clear and absolute 
denials of the right to vote, such as exclusions from an electorate.  In Kramer, 
the Court reviewed a statute that barred the plaintiff, a bona fide resident of 
a school district, from voting in the school district election.22  The law al-
lowed only those district residents who owned or leased property in the 
school district, or were parents or guardians of children in the school district, 
to vote in the school district election.23  The plaintiff was a childless bachelor 
who lived at his parents’ house.24  The State argued that the statute reasonably 
limited voting to those who were directly affected by school decisions: those 
who paid property taxes and those with children in the school system.25  After 
applying strict scrutiny in reviewing the plaintiff’s exclusion,26 the Court re-
jected the state’s arguments, ultimately ruling that even if the State’s interest 
                                                        
for the burden imposed by its rule”).  However, when voting regulations that restrict the right to 
vote are not related to voter qualifications, they must be extremely well-justified.  See Crawford v. 
Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189 (2008) (plurality opinion) (“Thus, under the standard 
applied in Harper, even rational restrictions on the right to vote are invidious if they are unrelated 
to voter qualifications.”). 
 19.  Election laws invariably stop some voters from voting.  See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 
(“Election laws will invariably impose some burden upon individual voters.”).  
 20.  Compare Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (noting that in the context of election laws that some-
what limit voters’ rights, “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify 
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions”), with Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627 (“Therefore, if a chal-
lenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizen-
ship and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are neces-
sary to promote a compelling state interest.”).  For a discussion of when the restrictions on 
limitations on the right to cast a ballot are very strict and when they are less strict, see Joshua A. 
Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?,  18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143 (2008).  
 21.  395 U.S. 621 (1969).  
 22.  For a fulsome discussion of Kramer, see Eugene D. Mazo, The Right to Vote in Local 
Elections, The Story of Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, in ELECTION LAW STORIES 
(Joshua A. Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016).  
 23.  Kramer, 395 U.S. at 622 (“The legislation provides that in certain New York school dis-
tricts residents who are otherwise eligible to vote in state and federal elections may vote in the 
school district election only if they (1) own (or lease) taxable real property within the district, or (2) 
are parents (or have custody of) children enrolled in the local public schools.”). 
 24.  Id. at 624. 
 25.  Id. at 631.  
 26.  The Court first considered “whether the exclusion is necessary to promote a compelling 
state interest,” then concluded that the statute was “not sufficiently tailored to limiting the franchise 
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was compelling, the statute was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the 
State’s interest.27  The law’s restrictions were both overinclusive and under-
inclusive, because the law allowed some who did not appear to have a direct 
interest in the school board election—“uninterested unemployed young 
m[e]n who pay[] no state or federal taxes, but who rent[] an apartment in the 
district”—to vote, but excluded others who did appear to have a direct inter-
est in the school board election—“[one who] reside[d] with his parents in the 
school district, pays state and federal taxes and is interested in and affected 
by school board decisions”—from the electorate.28  The Court ruled the stat-
ute’s limitations unconstitutional.29 
The level of scrutiny a law will face depends on the harm the law inflicts 
on a voter’s right to vote, not the type of law at issue.  For example, Dunn v. 
Blumstein30 and Marston v. Lewis31 were decided a year apart and involved 
voter registration laws, but were decided quite differently.  The Court applied 
strict scrutiny in Dunn, where the law stopped a bona fide resident from reg-
istering to vote.32 The Court applied lesser scrutiny in Marston, where the 
law required bona fide residents to register to vote by a certain day but did 
not stop bona fide residents from registering to vote.33 
In Dunn, the Court reviewed Tennessee’s durational residency require-
ment for registering to vote.  Tennessee required that to be eligible to register 
to vote a person must be a resident of Tennessee for a year and a resident of 
the county of registration for three months by the time of the ensuing elec-
tion.34  Simply, the law stopped some residents of Tennessee from joining 
the electorate.  The Court subjected the state’s durational residency require-
ment to strict scrutiny35 and struck down the law.36 
                                                        
to those ‘primarily interested’ in school affairs to justify the denial of the franchise to appellant and 
members of his class.”  Id. at 630, 633.  
 27.  Id. at 632. 
 28.  Id. at 632 n.15. 
 29.  Id. at 622, 633. 
 30.  405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
 31.  410 U.S. 679 (1973) (per curiam). 
 32.  405 U.S. at 331.  Tennessee prohibited those who had not been bona fide residents of the 
state for specific amount of time to register to vote.  Id. at 334. 
 33.  410 U.S. at 681.  Under the statutory structure, all who were eligible to vote at time of 
registration cutoff could register to vote.  Id. at 680. 
 34.  Dunn, 405 U.S. at 334.  Tennessee’s residency requirement was not at issue but could have 
survived strict scrutiny if necessary.  Id. at 343–44 (“An appropriately defined and uniformly ap-
plied requirement of bona fide residence may be necessary to preserve the basic conception of a 
political community, and therefore could withstand close constitutional scrutiny.”); see also Car-
rington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93–94 (1965) (noting a state may require bona fide residence for 
voting registration). 
 35.  Dunn, 405 U.S. at 335 (“In the present case, . . . we conclude that the State must show a 
substantial and compelling reason for imposing durational residence requirements.”). 
 36.  Id. at 360. 
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Tennessee claimed its dual desires to prevent fraud and to ensure knowl-
edgeable voters justified its durational residency requirement.37  The Court 
found avoiding fraud is a compelling state interest, but found the durational 
residency requirement unnecessary to further that interest.38  Similarly, the 
Court found that even if having knowledgeable voters is a compelling state 
interest, the durational residency requirement was not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored to meet that interest.39  Tennessee could require a person seeking to 
register to vote to be a bona fide resident of the state at the time of registration 
but could not require the person to be a bona fide resident for any period of 
time before registering.40 
In Marston, the Court reviewed Arizona’s voter registration law that 
closed voter registration fifty days prior to state elections.  The registration 
scheme did not stop bona fide residents from registering to vote prior to the 
cut-off.  However, the registration cut-off coupled with Arizona’s residency 
requirement functionally created a fifty-day residency requirement for voting 
such that no one who had been a resident in Arizona for less than fifty days 
on Election Day could vote in Arizona state elections.41  The Court applied a 
significantly less exacting level of scrutiny to Arizona’s law than Tennessee’s 
law. 
Arizona’s justification for its early state registration cut-off was based 
on its idiosyncratic system.  Structured to make its registration process con-
venient for voters, Arizona used many volunteer deputy registrars.42  How-
ever, those volunteers were prone to make a significant number of errors in 
the registration process.43  In addition, the timing of Arizona’s primaries re-
quired that county recorders delay checking and processing voter registration 
forms during a significant part of the fall.44  Consequently, Arizona claimed 
its recorders needed fifty days to check and certify Arizona’s voting rolls, 
hence the fifty-day voter registration deadline before state elections.45 
The Marston Court applied little scrutiny to the law.  The Court credited 
Arizona’s explanation for why it needed so much time to review its voter 
rolls before its state elections without engaging in an independent analysis of 
                                                        
 37.  Id. at 345. 
 38.  Id. at 353 (deciding “that the waiting period is not the least restrictive means necessary for 
preventing fraud”). 
 39.  Id. at 357–58 (noting that Kramer had already decided that excluding residents from a 
school board electorate based on a lack of sufficient interest in an election’s outcome was unconsti-
tutional). 
 40.  Id. at 360. 
 41.  Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 680 (1973) (per curiam). 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id. at 680–81. 
 44.  Id. at 681.  
 45.  Id. at 680. 
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the explanation.46  It ruled a state could end voter registration well before 
state elections to allow the state to finalize its voter records before an elec-
tion.47  The Court then endorsed Arizona’s claim that it needed fifty days 
before state elections to check its voter rolls.48  The Court so found even 
though states could end voter registration a maximum of thirty days before a 
presidential election under the Voting Rights Act,49 a cutoff later reiterated 
in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993.50  As important, the Court 
ignored Arizona’s role in creating the problems that necessitated the early 
registration cut-off.  Indeed, Justice Marshall noted in dissent that the volume 
of mistakes in Arizona voter registrations occurred because the state did not 
train its workers properly and refused to use additional resources to ensure 
the accuracy of its voter rolls.51  Nonetheless, the Court agreed that Arizona 
needed, and could take, fifty days to check its voter rolls.52 
The Marston Court’s decision was somewhat unsurprising.  Arizona’s 
law allowed all bona fide residents to register as of the time voter registration 
closed.  The state’s need to prepare accurate rolls—not the desire to stop res-
idents from voting—led to the registration cut-off that stopped the residents 
from casting ballots on Election Day.  That justification can reasonably be 
subject to lesser scrutiny than a state’s bald desire to stop bona fide residents 
from registering, as was the case in Dunn. 
The Marston Court’s application of a balancing approach was a precur-
sor to the Court’s explicit adoption of a balancing test in Anderson v. Cele-
brezze53 and Burdick v. Takushi.54  The Anderson/Burdick rule calibrates the 
level of scrutiny a law faces to the burden the law places on the right to vote.55  
                                                        
 46.  Id. at 680 (“We accept that judgment [that 50 days is necessary to correct the voter rolls], 
particularly in light of the realities of Arizona’s registration and voting procedures.”). 
 47.  Id. (“States have valid and sufficient interests in providing for some period of time—prior 
to an election—in order to prepare adequate voter records and protect its electoral processes from 
possible frauds.”). 
 48.  Id. at 681 (“In the present case, we are confronted with a recent and amply justifiable leg-
islative judgment that 50 days rather than 30 is necessary to promote the State’s important interest 
in accurate voter lists.”).  
 49.  See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354 (1972).  
 50.  52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–11 (2012).  
 51.  Marston, 410 U.S. at 682–83 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 52.  Id. at 681 (majority opinion) (“On the basis of the evidence before the District Court, it is 
clear that the State has demonstrated that the 50-day voter registration cutoff (for election of state 
and local officials) is necessary to permit preparation of accurate voter lists.”). 
 53.  460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
 54.  504 U.S. 428 (1992).  
 55.  Id. at 432 (“Petitioner proceeds from the erroneous assumption that a law that imposes any 
burden upon the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny.  Our cases do not so hold.”); Ander-
son, 460 U.S. at 788 (“Although these rights of voters are fundamental, not all restrictions imposed 
by the States on candidates’ eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally suspect burdens on 
voters’ rights to associate or to choose among candidates.”).  
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It recognizes that election laws will limit the right to vote to some extent, 
possibly by limiting for whom a voter can vote or by limiting a voter’s ability 
to cast a ballot.56  However, different laws burden the right to vote differently.  
The more serious the burden on the right to vote, the more serious the scrutiny 
will be.57  Severe restrictions trigger strict scrutiny; reasonable restrictions 
trigger a balancing test.58  Consequently, under the Anderson/Burdick test, a 
court must first determine whether to use strict scrutiny or the balancing 
test.59 
When applied, the balancing test weighs the strength of the state’s in-
terests against the severity of the statute’s restrictions on the right to vote. 60  
In neither Anderson nor Burdick were the burdens on the right to vote serious 
enough to trigger strict scrutiny.  That was understandable.  Both Anderson 
and Burdick involved laws that limited voters’ ability to vote for their candi-
date of choice, rather than laws that stopped voters from casting a ballot.  An-
derson involved Ohio’s statutory deadline for filing a statement of candidacy 
for the United States presidency.61  Burdick involved Hawaii’s limitation on 
write-in voting.62  In both cases, voters were allowed to cast a ballot.  They 
were merely limited in for whom they could vote.  Those limitations were 
based on purely administrative rules that directly regulated the candidate and 
only indirectly limited the voter. 
The balancing test led to different results in the two cases.  The Ander-
son Court ruled that Ohio’s desire for political stability expressed through its 
early deadline for declaring one’s candidacy did not outweigh the limitation 
                                                        
 56.  Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (“Election laws will invariably impose some burden upon indi-
vidual voters.”); see also Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (“Each provision of these schemes, whether it 
governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or 
the voting process itself, inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote 
and his right to associate with others for political ends.”). 
 57.  Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (“[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state 
election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.”).   
 58.  See id.  
 59.  This can lead to indeterminacy in constitutional election law jurisprudence.  For a discus-
sion of such indeterminacy, see Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1836 (2013). 
 60.  Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 (“In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the 
legitimacy and strength of each of [the state’s] interests, it also must consider the extent to which 
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.  Only after weighing all these fac-
tors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitu-
tional.”).  
 61.  Id. at 782. 
 62.  Burdick, 504 U.S. at 430 (“The issue in this case is whether Hawaii’s prohibition on write-
in voting unreasonably infringes upon its citizens’ rights under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.”). 
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on a candidate’s supporters’ ability to vote for the candidate.63  The Burdick 
Court determined that Hawaii’s limitation on write-in voting was justified 
given its ballot access rules were reasonable.64 
More than a decade later, the Court applied the Anderson/Burdick test 
in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,65 which involved a voter ID 
law that directly limited voters’ ability to cast a ballot.66  The voter ID law 
was considered an election integrity measure that incidentally limited a 
voter’s right to cast a ballot, rather than an attempt to block a voter’s right to 
vote.67  Crawford involved a constitutional challenge to Indiana’s voter photo 
identification (“photo ID”) law, which required voters who voted in person 
at the polls on Election Day or in a clerk’s office before Election Day to pro-
duce photo ID before voting.68  The law limited acceptable forms of photo 
ID to those that included the voter’s name and photograph and were issued 
by the United States or the State of Indiana.69  A voter who did not bring 
acceptable identification to the polls could vote using a provisional ballot and 
have the ballot counted if the voter brought acceptable identification to the 
clerk’s office within ten days of the election.70  The law also included excep-
tions for some people who did not possess acceptable identification.  For ex-
ample, people who did not want to be photographed for identification cards 
or were too poor to pay the fees necessary to obtain acceptable identification 
                                                        
 63.  Anderson, 460 U.S. at 805–06 (“We conclude that Ohio’s March filing deadline for inde-
pendent candidates for the office of President of the United States cannot be justified by the State’s 
asserted interest in protecting political stability.”). 
 64.  Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441–42 (“We think that Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting, con-
sidered as part of an electoral scheme that provides constitutionally sufficient ballot access, does 
not impose an unconstitutional burden upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the 
State’s voters.”). 
 65.  553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
 66.  Those laws necessarily deny some voters the opportunity to cast a ballot.  See id. at 197–
98 (noting that burdens of photo ID might lead to a voter’s inability to cast a ballot); Jack Citrin et 
al., The Effects of Voter ID Notification on Voter Turnout: Results from a Large-Scale Field Exper-
iment, 13 ELECTION L.J. 228, 229 (2014) (“Many adult citizens, especially among putatively vul-
nerable groups, indeed lack accepted forms of identification, and obtaining identification may be 
time-consuming and confusing even in states that make voting IDs available for free.”).  Precisely 
how many voters are affected is unclear.  See Michael Pitts, Empirically Measuring the Impact of 
Photo ID over Time and Its Impact on Women, 48 IND. L. REV. 605, 606 (2015) (noting the lack of 
substantial empirical research on precisely how many people are disfranchised by voter ID laws). 
 67.  See Robert S. Erikson & Lorraine C. Minnite, Modeling Problems in the Voter Identifica-
tion–Voter Turnout Debate, 8 ELECTION L.J. 85, 86 (2009) (noting that voter ID laws were passed 
ostensibly “as anti-fraud, voter confidence, ‘good government’ reforms”). 
 68.  See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 185 (plurality opinion).   
 69.  Id. at 211–12 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 70.  See id. at 186 (plurality opinion). 
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could vote provisionally and sign an affidavit to have their provisional ballot 
counted.71  The plurality found the law’s burdens not severe.72 
Using the Anderson/Burdick balancing approach to weigh the law’s ben-
efits against its harm to voters to determine its constitutionality, the Court 
upheld the law.73  Indiana claimed the photo ID law protected multiple state 
interests: deterring and detecting voter fraud, modernizing election proce-
dures, preventing voter fraud stemming from Indiana’s bloated voting rolls, 
counting only legitimate votes, and protecting public confidence in elec-
tions.74  Though Indiana did not prove the existence of voter fraud the law 
was supposed to address, the plurality found Indiana’s interests significant. 75  
The plurality deemed Indiana’s interests in requiring government issued ID 
to vote to outweigh the statute’s limitations on voters,76 and Indiana’s voter 
ID law survived.77 
The Court’s application of the Anderson/Burdick test in Crawford clar-
ified the test somewhat.  The burden on the right to vote is measured by the 
steps the law forces the voter to take to enable the voter to vote.  The more 
onerous the steps, the heavier the burden on the right to vote and the more 
likely strict scrutiny will apply.  The less onerous the steps, the lighter the 
burden on the right to vote and the more likely the balancing test will apply.  
Technological advances would appear irrelevant to that issue.  However, how 
severely the right to vote is deemed to have been burdened should depend not 
                                                        
 71.  See id.   
 72.  See id. at 202–03 (“When we consider only the statute’s broad application to all Indiana 
voters we conclude that it ‘imposes only a limited burden on voters’ rights.’” (quoting Burdick v. 
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992))).  Indeed, the plurality noted that obtaining a free Indiana photo 
identification card was no bigger burden than getting a driver’s license.  Id. at 198.  In suggesting 
that getting a voter identification card under Indiana law is not difficult, the concurrence noted that 
“nonsevere, nondiscriminatory restrictions” on the ability to vote should be judged on “a deferential, 
‘important regulatory interests’ standard” with strict scrutiny being used only when the law “se-
verely restrict[s] the right to vote.”  Id. at 204 (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433–34); see also Pitts, 
supra note 66, at 617 (“[T]he amount of actual disfranchisement created by a photo identification 
law may well depend on the nature of the photo identification law adopted.”). 
 73.  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190 (plurality opinion) (“Rather than applying any ‘litmus test’ that 
would neatly separate valid from invalid restrictions, we concluded that a court must identify and 
evaluate the interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, 
and then make the ‘hard judgment’ that our adversary system demands.”).  
 74.  Id. at 191.  
 75.  Id. at 196–97 (deeming potential voter fraud concerns important); id. at 197 (validating the 
state’s interest in bolstering public confidence in the state’s electoral system). 
 76.  Id. at 204.  The concurrence agreed with the plurality that the law’s overall burden is min-
imal and justified.  See id. at 204–05 (Scalia, J., concurring).  The dissenters argued Indiana’s inter-
ests are small, the law’s burdens are significant, and the proper frame is whether the interests Indiana 
claims outweigh the burdens placed on individuals who do not have the required identification and 
cannot cast a ballot as a result.  See, e.g., id. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that many of those 
burdened by the law will be deterred by the law). 
 77.  Id. at 204. 
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only on the voter’s burden, but also on whether the state needs to restrict the 
right to vote at all. Technological advances would be relevant to that issue. 
Limitations on the ability to cast a ballot do not appear, on their face, to 
involve the absolute denial of the right to vote or invidious discrimination.  
However, if the use of technology can solve the problems the state seeks to 
address—without limiting the voter’s ability to cast a ballot—applying strict 
scrutiny to the law would be sensible.  As technology obviates the state’s 
reasons to deny a voter the ability to cast a ballot, the refusal to allow a voter 
to cast a ballot becomes an intentional refusal to allow a voter to vote.  That 
should be deemed a severe burden on the right to vote even if the law does 
not force the voter to undertake onerous steps to vote.  Of course, whether 
technology can eliminate the need for any particular law’s limitation on a 
voter’s ability to cast a ballot depends on the technology and the law at issue.  
The next Part considers how well technology can address a state’s concerns 
that underlie common limitations on voters’ ability to cast a ballot. 
II.  VOTING AND ELECTION LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 
Voting and election laws may prevent voters from casting ballots as a 
result of the state’s need to structure its election processes efficiently.78  
Technology may help jurisdictions run their election processes just as effi-
ciently, while allowing more voters to vote than the election laws would oth-
erwise allow.79  A jurisdiction’s refusal to use such technology should be 
relevant to whether it has discharged its constitutional responsibility to pro-
tect the right to vote.80  This Part briefly discusses three types of election laws 
that may limit a voter’s ability to cast a ballot—voter registration deadlines, 
limits on out-of-precinct voting, and voter ID laws—and considers how eas-
ily technology may obviate the need for each type of law.81 
                                                        
 78.  See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992). 
 79.  See EAC REPORT, supra note 5, at ii (noting increased use of electronic pollbooks by ju-
risdictions from 2016 to 2018). 
 80.  For a discussion of how legislative intent can trigger strict scrutiny, see Henry L. Cham-
bers, Jr., Retooling the Intent Requirement Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 611, 613–15 (2004).  
 81.  Sometimes all of these laws arise in a single piece of legislation.  See Karlan, supra note 
9, at 152 (discussing N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 
2016), cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017), which involved a “statute that imposed a photo ID re-
quirement, cut back on early voting, and eliminated same-day registration during the early voting 
period, out-of-precinct voting on Election Day, and preregistration for sixteen- and seventeen-year-
olds”).   
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A.  Voter Registration Deadlines and Same-Day Registration 
The Constitution does not require states to allow voters to register and 
vote on the same day.82  States may require voters register up to thirty days 
before an election to be eligible to vote in the election.83  The Supreme Court 
concluded in 1972 that—based on technology then available—thirty days 
was sufficient time for states to check their rolls and ensure a voter’s eligi-
bility.84  Nonetheless, today, some states do not have a voter registration cut-
off.  North Dakota does not require voter registration,85 and some states allow 
residents to register and vote on the same day (“same-day registration”).86 
Though same-day registration has become common, many states retain 
pre-Election Day voter registration cutoffs.87  States may have kept voter reg-
istration laws on the assumption they are necessary to help produce accurate 
voter rolls to be used during an election.88  An accurate voter roll can produce 
myriad administrative benefits, including helping to shorten the lines at poll-
ing places on Election Day, as poll workers focus on checking voters in and 
getting them through the voting process.89  However, the issue is how long is 
                                                        
 82.  Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 680 (1973) (“We recognized [in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U.S. 330 (1972)] that a person does not have a federal constitutional right to walk up to a voting 
place on election day and demand a ballot.”). 
 83.  For a list of voter registration cut-off dates for the 2018 election, see Voter Registration 
Deadlines, NONPROFIT VOTE, https://www.nonprofitvote.org/voting-in-your-state/voter-registra-
tion-deadlines/ (last updated Apr. 30, 2019).  Virginia requires registration twenty-two days before 
a general or primary election.  See How to Register, VA DEP’T ELECTIONS, https://www.elec-
tions.virginia.gov/registration/how-to-register/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).  
 84.  The Court thought checking much of the information relevant to voting registration was 
easy.  See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348 (1972) (“Objective information tendered as rele-
vant to the question of bona fide residence under Tennessee law—places of dwelling, occupation, 
car registration, driver’s license, property owned, etc.—is easy to doublecheck, especially in light 
of modern communications.” (footnote omitted)); see also EAC REPORT, supra note 5, at iii (noting 
many states keep their voter registration files up to date by linking their voter registration databases 
with other government databases). 
 85.  See Voters, N.D. SECRETARY OF ST., https://vip.sos.nd.gov/PortalListDe-
tails.aspx?ptlhPKID=79&ptlPKID=7 (last visited July 30, 2019).  
 86.  To see how states with same-day registration manage their processes, see Same Day Voter 
Registration, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 28, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elec-
tions-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx. 
 87.  Unfortunately, those laws have not always served a salutary purpose.  See Daniel P. Tokaji, 
Voter Registration and Election Reform, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 453, 456 (2008) (“Practi-
cally from their inception, voter registration lists have served a dual purpose.  They have served the 
constructive role of ensuring that only eligible voters participate in elections and that they vote only 
once in each election.  They have also served the less worthy end of allowing those in control of the 
administration of elections to impede their political opponents’ supporters from participating.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 88.  See Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (reviewing voter registration cutoff statute in 
place to ensure accuracy of voter rolls).  
 89.  See Levitt, supra note 6, at 471 (“Lines may bog down when voters’ names cannot easily 
be found on the pollbook—which may indicate a systematic registration problem causing outright 
disenfranchisement.”).  
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necessary to produce those rolls.  Election officials may have required several 
weeks to produce an accurate voter roll in years past, but as states with same-
day registration suggest, with today’s technology, the time required to pro-
duce an accurate voter roll may be significantly shorter.90 
Even if accurate voter rolls are critical, voter registration deadlines con-
flate the need to have accurate voter rolls with the need to stop those who 
have not registered to vote weeks before the election from voting.  Those 
issues may be related, but they are distinct.  Weeks before an election, a state 
can stop the flow of new registration information that will appear on Election 
Day voter rolls.  However, the state need not refuse to accept new registra-
tions in the last few weeks of an election cycle.  That voter registration infor-
mation can be verified but segregated from the voter rolls until after the elec-
tion.  On Election Day, the most recent registrants could be required to vote 
at voting centers rather than precincts if the precinct pollbooks would not 
contain the most recent registrants’ voter information.91 
Technology can even alleviate the need to treat the newest registrants 
differently from old registrants.  If a state can verify the voter’s information 
on the same day it receives the information, same-day registration is easy.  
Some voters might not have the documentation necessary to confirm their 
eligibility on the day they attempt to register.  However, that would not nec-
essarily justify a state’s refusal to allow those who do have sufficient docu-
mentation to register and vote on Election Day.  Moreover, even when the 
state cannot instantly verify an individual’s eligibility, eligibility likely can 
be verified within a few days of the election.92 
Technology exists to quickly cross-check the information eligible voters 
provide when registering to vote.93  The information a state must check to 
verify voter registration status is not invariably overwhelming.  For example, 
                                                        
 90.  States that allow same-day registration presumably believe reasonably accurate voter rolls 
can be produced almost instantaneously.  
 91.  Many states that allow same day registration and voting address such registration at loca-
tions other than precincts.  See Same Day Voter Registration, supra note 86.   
 92.  The combination of states linking their voting databases to other state databases coupled 
with real time updating of voting records suggests a state can produce relatively accurate voter rolls 
very quickly.  See EAC REPORT, supra note 5, at iii (noting links between voter record databases 
and other state databases) and app. A at 135–36 (noting some states update their voter registration 
files in real time).   
93. See Herbert Lin et al., Increasing the Security of the U.S. Election Infrastructure, in SECURING 
AMERICAN ELECTIONS: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF 
THE 2020 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND BEYOND 23 (Michael McFaul ed., 2019), https://fsi-
live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/stanford_cyber_policy_center-securing_ameri-
can_elections.pdf (noting the interconnectedness of voter registration and other databases); Tokaji, 
supra note 87, at 500 (noting the requirement under the Help America Vote Act of 2002 
(“HAVA”) that “statewide voter registration databases . . . must now be coordinated with state 
motor vehicle, criminal, and death records”).   
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the Commonwealth of Virginia’s voter registration form requires the follow-
ing information from a registrant: name, residence, social security number, 
citizenship status, date of birth, gender, felony status/rights restoration status, 
and signature.94  Additional information requested includes military active-
duty service status, additional address information if the residence address is 
insufficient for voting purposes, and the applicant’s voter registration status 
in other states.   
Checking voter registration information may be more onerous in states, 
like Virginia, with strict felon disfranchisement laws.  Those states might 
require a criminal records check.95  With the possible cooperation of the fed-
eral government, checking criminal records—even from other states—should 
not be any more onerous than a firearms background check, which can be 
completed quickly.96  A state that disfranchises felons and former felons re-
stricts the right to vote, so the burden should be on the state to check data-
bases quickly to determine if a registrant is a felon whose rights have not 
been restored.97  Given the information available in state and national data-
bases, an applicant’s social security number should allow the state to find the 
information it needs to verify the registrant’s information quickly.98  At the 
least, the voting rights of the many need not be narrowed due to an early voter 
registration deadline because the state might not be able to determine the el-
igibility of the few close to Election Day.  Those who can be verified as valid 
voters could be registered and allowed to vote if the state wanted those citi-
zens to vote.99  A state may not wish to expend resources on same-day regis-
tration, but such a state is not unable to register voters accurately on the day 
of an election; it is merely unwilling to do so. 
Though a state may argue that it needs time before an election to pro-
duce accurate rolls, the earlier the state sets its voter registration deadline, the 
less complete its voter rolls may be.  Database information can become stale 
                                                        
94. VIRGINIA VOTER REGISTRATION APPLICATION (July 2019), https://www.elections.vir-
ginia.gov/media/formswarehouse/veris-voter-registration/applications/Voter-Registration-Appli-
cation.pdf.  Many states require similar information.  Michigan requires citizenship status; age; 
driver’s license number or last four digits of Social Security number; name; residence; and an af-
firmation that the applicant will be eighteen by Election Day, will be a resident of the city/town-
ship for thirty days by Election Day, and is a citizen of the United States.  STATE OF MICHIGAN 
VOTER REGISTRATION APPLICATION, (Feb. 2019), https://www.michigan.gov/docu-
ments/MIVoterRegistration_97046_7.pdf. 
 95.  See EAC REPORT, supra note 5, at iii (noting that some states share information such that 
they can check their voter registration records against their prison records).  
 96.  For a discussion of the potential speed of a criminal background check, see National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System (NICS), FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/nics (last vis-
ited Oct. 9, 2019).  
 97.  See EAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 149–52 (noting each state’s criminal disfranchisement 
laws).   
 98.  See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  
 99.  See Levitt, supra note 6, at 486.  
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if the database cannot be comprehensively updated after a certain date.100  For 
example, a person who moves a few weeks before an election may be listed 
as a voter in a precinct even though the voter is no longer a resident in the 
precinct.  The incorrect information may not render that individual unable to 
vote, but it is incorrect.101  Closing voter registration and limiting voter-initi-
ated changes to voter information provided well before the election may lead 
to less accurate rather than more accurate rolls.102 
Even if a state has a legitimate concern about errors in its voter rolls, 
that concern does not justify refusing to allow valid voters to register and 
vote after the registration deadline.  Database errors exist, but a database error 
does not negate the voter’s right to vote.103  Errors in a voter’s voter registra-
tion application should not stop the voter from voting if the voter can be 
proven to be a qualified voter.  Indeed, even errors in a voter’s registration 
file should not disqualify a voter, though inaccurate information may confuse 
poll workers.104 
Same-day registration and voting is possible and common.  Technology 
exists that can accurately complete the voter verification process and update 
the state’s voter rolls quickly.105  States have multiple options to jettison their 
early voter registration deadlines.106  They can shorten the registration dead-
lines from weeks to days before the election.  They can allow same-day reg-
istration and voting if the registrant’s information can be verified on Election 
Day.  They can allow registrants to vote provisionally and count the votes if 
the registrant’s voter information is verified within a few days of the elec-
tion.107  Each option allows more voting and more protection for the right to 
vote than an early registration deadline. 
Once a technological fix exists to resolve a state’s concerns with same-
day registration and voting, the state’s choice to have a registration cutoff 
                                                        
 100.  Maintaining accurate voter registration information requires removing incorrect infor-
mation from voting rolls as well.  See EAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 40. 
 101.  See Tokaji, supra note 87, at 469 (discussing the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 
(“NVRA”) provisions that allow voters who have changed addresses before Election Day without 
giving notice to election officials to vote under some circumstances).   
 102.  Keeping voter rolls up to date may be facilitated by not having early voter registration cut-
off dates, as same-day registration necessarily updates voter registration files in real time.  See EAC 
REPORT, supra note 5, at 123–24 (discussing prevalence of same-day registration). 
 103.  See EAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 45 (noting more than 837,000 same-day registrations in 
the 2018 general election cycle).  
 104.  See Levitt, supra note 6, at 486 (discussing technology that can find and allow poll workers 
to account for minor mistakes in voter registration files quickly). 
 105.  Id. at 485–86. 
 106.  See Provisional Ballots, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 15, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/provisional-ballots.aspx (noting various 
ways states address out-of-precinct voting). 
 107.  See Tokaji, supra note 87, at 500 (explaining that same day registration tends to eliminate 
the need for provisional ballots because registrations can be updated on Election Day). 
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weeks in advance of an election is no longer an administrative necessity or 
choice regarding how to run an election efficiently; it is a choice to prevent 
eligible voters from voting.  The more easily a state can provide same-day 
registration and voting, the more clearly the registration cutoff appears to be 
a choice to impede residents from voting.  A state’s choice to cut off its voter 
registration weeks before an election appears to be a choice to decline to al-
low voters to join the electorate when no good reason exists to do so.  That 
should be deemed an intentional choice to deny a voter’s right to vote or a 
substantial limitation on the right to vote.108  Either could trigger the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny. 
B.  Out-of-Precinct Voting 
Some jurisdictions with precinct-based systems bar out-of-precinct vot-
ing on Election Day.109  Precincts—physical polling places serving physical 
territory—are a staple of American elections, though some states and juris-
dictions have abandoned them for vote-by-mail regimes.110  Nonetheless, 
precincts are unlikely to be abandoned wholesale by American jurisdictions 
soon, so bans on out-of-precinct voting are unlikely to be eliminated in the 
near future.  This is so even though bans on out-of-precinct voting stop eligi-
ble, registered voters from voting, a result that might appear to be a substan-
tial limitation on the right to vote that could trigger strict scrutiny.111 
Though precinct-based systems can trigger problems, they can be sen-
sible and convenient.  This is so when precinct lines correspond to voting 
district lines.  For example, consider a city with a mayor and five-member 
city council that divides into five precincts.  Each ballot in each precinct 
would contain two races, one for the mayor’s race and one for the precinct’s 
city council race.  That makes Election Day balloting and vote counting as 
easy as possible.  The vote totals from a precinct would determine that pre-
cinct’s city council member.  The vote totals from all five precincts would be 
aggregated to determine the winner of the mayor’s race.  The convenience of 
                                                        
 108.  The use of voter registration to limit voting is not without historical precedent.  See Tokaji, 
supra note 87, at 506 (“What we do know is that, throughout its history, registration has served both 
the laudable purpose of promoting the integrity of the electoral process and the less worthy purpose 
of excluding eligible voters.”). 
 109.  See, e.g., Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 842 F.3d 613, 616–17 (9th Cir. 2016), 
reh’g granted en banc, 840 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing Arizona’s bar on out-of-precinct 
voting on Election Day).  
 110.  Some jurisdictions do not need to worry about out-of-precinct voting because they do not 
have precinct-based voting systems.  See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact, Unified 
Law, 128 YALE L.J. 1566, 1643–46 (2019) (discussing all-mail voting systems).   
 111.  Jurisdictions address out-of-precinct voting in a variety of fashions.  See EAC REPORT, 
supra note 5, at 146–47 (indicating how states treat provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct). 
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precinct-based voting and benefits stemming from it make bans on Election 
Day out-of-precinct voting appear reasonable. 
Prohibiting out-of-precinct voting appears practical for at least two rea-
sons.112  First, in some circumstances, voting outside of one’s precinct might 
cause a voter to vote on the wrong ballot.  In the example above, a voter 
voting outside of their precinct would necessarily vote in a race in which they 
should not vote—the city council race in a precinct in which they do not live.  
However, the wrong ballot problem will not arise in every election.  In some 
elections, many precincts will use the same ballot.  In a large city, each city 
council district may contain many precincts that use the same ballot.  A voter 
would be given the same ballot in any precinct in their district.  The same 
might occur when a small number of large races are on a ballot.  For example, 
some states hold state elections in different years than federal elections.113  
Consequently, during a federal election, when the races on the ballot may be 
limited to a House of Representatives race and a U.S. Senate race, many pre-
cincts will use the same ballot.  A voter who votes out of precinct, but in their 
congressional district, will receive the same ballot they would have had they 
voted in their precinct.  Nonetheless, the wrong ballot problem can be an 
issue in other elections. 
Out-of-precinct voting may trigger a second concern: double voting.  
Some jurisdictions use precinct-based paper pollbooks that contain a list of 
registered voters in the precinct.114  A voter who votes out of precinct may 
not be marked as having voted in her assigned precinct’s pollbook.  That 
voter might be able to vote again—either in her precinct or another precinct—
before being marked as having voted.  That problem could be solved in a 
low-tech manner by requiring out-of-precinct voters to vote on provisional 
ballots that would only be counted if the voter did not also vote in her as-
signed precinct.115  Nonetheless, the concern may exist. 
The wrong ballot and double voting problems are legitimate concerns, 
but each may be lessened or resolved with technology.  The wrong ballot 
problem can be resolved through the use of electronic pollbooks.  Electronic 
                                                        
 112.  To see how some states that allow out-of-precinct voting address problems, see Provisional 
Ballots, supra note 107. 
 113.  Various states hold state elections in odd-numbered years.  See Karl Kirtz, Why do Four 
States Have Odd-Year Elections?, THE THICKET AT ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2011, 2:34 PM), 
https://ncsl.typepad.com/the_thicket/2011/08/why-do-four-states-have-odd-year-elections.html 
(discussing elections in Virginia, New Jersey, Louisiana, and Mississippi).  
 114.  See EAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 40 (“Voter registration also serves to assign each voter 
to a precinct—a bounded geographic area to which voters are assigned according to their residential 
address as listed in their voter registration record—so that voters receive the correct ballot in the 
election.”). 
 115.  That is the solution when a voter who is not on the registration rolls attempts to vote.  See 
EAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 3; Tokaji, supra note 87, at 472 (noting HAVA requires states pro-
vide provisional ballots if voter’s name is not on registration list when voter arrives at polling place). 
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pollbooks can identify a voter’s assigned precinct.116  A state or jurisdiction 
could provide electronic copies of ballots for every precinct in the state.  The 
correct ballot could be printed for the out-of-precinct voter and voted provi-
sionally at any precinct or polling place.117  Alternatively, the out-of-precinct 
voter could be allowed to vote in whatever races appeared both on the ballot 
at the precinct where the voter appeared and on the ballot from the voter’s 
assigned precinct.118  If the state declined to provide an electronic sample 
ballot from the out-of-precinct voter’s assigned precinct in any form, the out-
of-precinct voter could be allowed to vote in statewide races, for example, 
U.S. President/U.S. Senator races or state governor races, using whatever bal-
lot was available at the polling place where the voter happened to be.119  The 
use of technology might be a bother for the state, but its use would allow an 
out-of-precinct voter to exercise her right to vote, even if in a limited manner. 
The double voting problem can be lessened or solved easily as well.  
Electronic pollbooks “allow[] poll workers to look up voters from the entire 
county or state[,] . . . [and] receive immediate updates on who has voted in 
other voting centers.”120  Access to whether the voter has already voted 
should eliminate the concern about double voting.121  Lingering concerns 
about double voting could be resolved by using provisional ballots for out-
of-precinct voting. 
Out-of-precinct voting may trigger another practical problem.  Allowing 
out-of-precinct voting could lengthen polling place lines, as more convenient 
precincts could become a magnet for out-of-precinct voters.122 In addition, 
the use of technology creates the opportunity for technological failure and 
possible chaos, also possibly creating longer lines at the polls.  Sending out-
of-precinct voters to the correct precinct will usually be easier for the state 
and for poll workers than serving out-of-precinct voters.  However, conven-
                                                        
 116.  See EAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 19 (discussing how jurisdictions use e-pollbooks). 
 117.  That would turn every polling place into a vote center.  See id. at 129 (discussing vote 
centers). 
 118.  See EAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 130 n.29 (noting Alaska partially counts provisional 
ballots voted out-of-precinct). 
 119.  A voter could also be allowed to vote in a jurisdiction-wide race, for example, a city-wide 
mayoral race, when the electronic pollbook shows the voter lives in the jurisdiction.  
 120.  Electronic Poll Books, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, (Oct. 25, 2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/electronic-pollbooks.aspx (discussing the 
capabilities of electronic pollbooks). 
 121.  Some states connect precinct e-pollbooks to state voter databases, while others prohibit the 
connection of e-pollbooks to the state voter database system.  See id. (“E-poll books in some states 
(Maryland and Indiana, for example) are networked and receive immediate updates on who has 
voted in other voting centers.  Other states (Minnesota and Michigan, for example) specify that e-
poll books may not be connected to the network.”) 
 122.  Concerns about long lines can be addressed with separate check-in for out-of-precinct vot-
ers, as can be done with same-day registrants.  See Levitt, supra note 6, at 486.  
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ience is the main justification.  As technology resolves the problems sur-
rounding out-of-precinct voting, retaining a ban on out-of-precinct voting ap-
pears to rest on how convenient the ban is for the state rather than on the 
state’s need to use the law to run elections efficiently. 
If technology can be used to determine that the voter who is standing in 
the incorrect precinct is a registered voter who can vote on the same ballot 
they would use were they in their assigned precinct, the voter should probably 
be allowed to vote in the wrong precinct instead of being forced to go to her 
assigned precinct.  The decision to force the voter to go to the proper precinct 
to vote is less an administrative decision than a choice to stop a voter from 
voting.  This is so particularly if a poll worker with an electronic pollbook 
can immediately determine whether a voter in the wrong precinct has voted 
and stop the voter from double voting.  The state should be required to have 
a very good reason for forcing the voter to go to another precinct to vote.  As 
technology obviates the need for a ban on out-of-precinct voting, the justifi-
cation for the ban should be very substantial, arguably so substantial that it 
could survive strict scrutiny. 
C.  Voter ID 
Some states require a voter to produce identification before voting in 
person.123  States can reasonably require that the person who is seeking to 
vote prove they are who they claim to be, even if there is little to no reason 
to believe voter impersonation fraud exists.124  Consequently, a state may 
require a voter provide some form of identification that reasonably proves to 
the state the voter is who the voter says they are.  Unfortunately, when the 
voter must produce a specific form of identification the state limits how a 
voter may reasonably prove identity.125  Taking reasonable proof of iden-
tity—rather than possession of a specific form of identification—as the real 
issue, if technology can provide reasonable proof of identity, the voter argu-
ably should not be required to show a specific form of ID or possibly any ID 
at all to vote. 
Technology can solve the problem of reasonably identifying the voter.  
Proof the voter is who they say they are can come in the form of cutting-edge 
biometric or facial recognition technology, but more mundane technology is 
                                                        
 123.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-643B (2018) (requiring a voter to present one of several 
forms of identification, including a driver’s license, passport, government-issued photo identifica-
tion, student photo identification from an in-state college, or an employment photo identification 
card). 
 124.  For a discussion of voter identification law in Virginia, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., State 
and Local Officials and Voter ID, 15 ELECTION L.J. 234 (2016).  
 125.  Under some state laws, producing one form of required identification is the only way a 
voter can prove identity to vote.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-643B. 
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sufficient.  Electronic pollbooks allow poll workers to link to state databases, 
such as parts of a state’s Department of Motor Vehicles, that contain the 
voter’s photo and other identifying information.126  Based on that infor-
mation—which is the same information that would be on a driver’s license—
the voter could be identified and allowed to vote without ID.  Some voters 
may object to poll workers having access to DMV records, even if the poll 
workers are limited to the information that would be contained on the voter’s 
driver’s license.  Those objectors could be provided the latitude to opt out 
and provide any other form of sufficient identification.  However, the issue 
is not whether objectors may object or opt out, it is whether the state should 
be encouraged to use technology or forced to justify not using technology 
that would allow individuals to vote without a specific form of qualifying 
identification. 
Currently, the Supreme Court views voter ID rules as limitations on the 
right to cast a ballot that are subject to rules regarding reasonableness.127  If 
technology eliminates the need for the state to require a voter to produce a 
physical ID when they seek to cast a ballot, the state’s demand that the voter 
do so is a serious and pointless limitation on the voter’s right to vote.  That 
limitation should trigger strict scrutiny, which requires a more searching in-
quiry regarding why the state requires its law. 
III.  TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND STRICT SCRUTINY 
This Essay posits that technological advances should change the level 
of scrutiny an election law faces when subject to constitutional challenge.  It 
suggests that a law now subject to a balancing test should, because technol-
ogy eliminates the need for the law, be subject to strict scrutiny in the future.  
Why and how such a move might occur merits a brief discussion.  That dis-
cussion starts with strict scrutiny doctrine and ends with the promise of pro-
tecting fundamental rights under the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court has provided a structure for assessing laws that bur-
den the right to vote.  The Court recognizes that states must run elections, 
and election laws may infringe on a voter’s right to vote or ability to cast a 
ballot.  That recognition is the impetus for the Court’s two-track system that 
subjects incidental infringements on the right to vote that are triggered by the 
state’s need to manage elections to a balancing test and subjects more sub-
stantial infringements on the right to vote to strict scrutiny.128  Of course, 
                                                        
 126.  See Electronic Poll Books, supra note 121.  
 127.  See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2008).   
 128.  See supra Part I. 
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there is gray area regarding how a law should be categorized.  It is that ques-
tion of categorization and how technology can change the categorization that 
is at issue. 
The three types of law discussed above—voter registration deadlines, 
bans on out-of-precinct voting, and voter ID laws—can all be considered 
election administration laws that incidentally infringe the right to vote.  Voter 
registration deadlines allow states to identify who is included in the electorate 
on Election Day, but also stop bona fide residents from voting.  Bans on out-
of-precinct voting may lessen Election Day confusion by stopping every poll-
ing place from becoming a provisional voting center for anyone who wishes 
to vote wherever they like, but those bans also stop bona fide residents from 
voting on Election Day.  Voter ID laws arguably allow poll workers to accu-
rately identify voters, but also stop registered voters in their correct precinct 
from voting.  Each has an election administration justification. However, 
technology may eliminate each justification.  If technology eliminates the 
justifications for a law that restricts a voter’s ability to vote, the law should 
be categorized as a serious infringement on the right to vote that should need 
to survive strict scrutiny. 
This may seem controversial to those who would argue that technology 
cannot change the nature of a law or the constitutional inquiry regarding the 
law.129  However, technology can change the nature of a constitutional prob-
lem.  For example, cell phone technology and data collection have changed 
the nature of the third-party doctrine under the Fourth Amendment.  The 
third-party doctrine holds that a person has no general expectation of privacy 
in information the person has provided to a third party, with government ac-
quisition of the information not to be deemed a search.130  However, Fourth 
Amendment doctrine was updated in Carpenter v. United States131 to accom-
modate a new technological reality.132  “[T]he Government[] acquisition of  
wireless carrier cell-site records revealing the location of [defendant]’s cell 
phone whenever it made or received calls”133—cell phone company business 
records in the hands of a third party—was deemed a search even though third-
party doctrine would seem to deem such acquisition a non-search.134  The 
                                                        
 129.  Under some circumstances, technology may change the nature of the item to be analyzed 
but may not change the nature of the constitutional inquiry.  See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. 
Ct. 2206, 2219–21 (2018) (discussing when the nature of information changes or nature of the doc-
trine to be applied changes or both).   
 130.  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
 131.  138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 132.  Id. at 2216 (“The question we confront today is how to apply the Fourth Amendment to a 
new phenomenon: the ability to chronicle a person’s past movements through the record of his cell 
phone signals.”). 
 133.  Id. at 2214. 
 134.  Id. at 2223. 
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Court held that the information at issue was subject to an expectation of pri-
vacy though it was in the hands of a third party.135  The third party’s posses-
sion of the information was deemed consistent with an expectation of pri-
vacy, in part, because the information was collected by the third party, not 
affirmatively given to the third party by the defendant.136  The technology 
that passively collected the information made that distinction more relevant.  
Whether the third-party doctrine is dead or has merely been restricted re-
mains to be seen, but it will likely never be quite the same.137 
Similarly, technology arguably has changed the nature of the election 
laws discussed above because they cannot be defended in their current broad 
form.  As noted above, the shortened length of time necessary to check 
whether a person is a valid voter obviates the need for a voter registration 
deadline weeks before an election.  Technological advances make bans on 
voting out-of-precinct far broader than necessary to serve the bans’ purposes.  
Requiring a voter present specific types of identification to vote, as the only 
method for a voter to prove the voter’s identity, is unnecessary given the state 
of technology.  Once the need for the law—in its current form—vanishes, the 
nature of the law and the reasons for retaining it change.  With advancing 
technology, the laws functionally cease to be election administration laws.  
They become laws that merely stop qualified voters from voting.  Such laws 
significantly affect a voter’s right to vote and should trigger strict scrutiny. 
Subjecting these election laws to strict scrutiny is sensible.  Doing so 
changes the focus from the state’s administrative necessity to the state’s in-
fringement of the right to vote.  That distinction mirrors the bifurcated struc-
ture the Supreme Court created to review election laws.  The Anderson/Bur-
dick balancing test is meant to give the state the latitude it needs to address 
administrative problems that do not suggest the desire to infringe on the right 
to vote.  Conversely, strict scrutiny forces the state to protect fundamental 
rights unless those rights must necessarily be infringed.138  Requiring strict 
scrutiny under these circumstances can have multiple positive effects.  First, 
it will allow more voters to vote.139  Second, it should provide voters more 
                                                        
 135.  Id. at 2219. 
 136.  Id. at 2220. 
 137.  Id. (noting that the decision is a narrow one not meant to destroy the principles underlying 
the third-party doctrine).  
 138.  That is the effect of narrow tailoring.  See Michael A. Helfand, How the Diversity Rationale 
Lays the Groundwork for New Discrimination: Examining the Trajectory of Equal Protection Doc-
trine, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 607, 630–31 (2009) (discussing received wisdom of purpose 
of narrow tailoring). 
 139.  See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 
15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
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confidence that the election process is working by making voting easier. 140  
Third, it encourages jurisdictions to think hard about why they have the elec-
tion rules they have and whether such laws are necessary.141 
The application of strict scrutiny does not guarantee that the laws at is-
sue will be invalidated.  However, they will need to be justified.  The state 
will need to argue it had little choice but to retain a law to protect electoral 
integrity, or another compelling interest, and infringed the right to vote as 
narrowly as possible.  If so, the law will survive.142 
During the strict scrutiny review, a state may present all arguments in 
favor of the laws and against implementing available technology.  For exam-
ple, technology is not perfect.143  Voting technology can be susceptible to 
hacking and other problems.144  Consequently, a state may not be acting un-
reasonably when it declines to purchase insufficiently tested technology, 
even if that technology could be used to help with same-day registration, out-
of-precinct voting or voter ID issues.  However, when states are working in 
the shadow of advanced technology that has been fully tested, a refusal to 
procure that technology should be strictly scrutinized when that refusal alone 
stops bona fide residents from voting.  The refusal to purchase technology 
that would allow a voter to register days before an election rather than weeks 
before an election is a denial of the right to vote.  It is not merely the result 
of a neutral election law. If the state wants to make its choice, it should be 
forced to defend that choice strenuously under a heightened standard. 
Cost could also be relevant to a state’s decision to decline to adopt new 
technology.145  Resource limitations matter.  A cost-benefit analysis may 
dovetail with the state’s consideration of whether the available technology is 
reliable enough to buy.  Though cost may be a factor, it should not be the 
only factor.  A state’s desire to save money may be relevant, but a state’s 
                                                        
 140.  Confidence in electoral process is an important state interest.  See Crawford v. Marion Cty. 
Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197 (2008). 
 141.  Legislatures must think deeply about restrictions on fundamental rights to narrowly tailor 
their laws sufficiently to survive strict scrutiny. 
 142.  See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006) (discussing when laws survive strict 
scrutiny). 
 143.   See ADONA ET AL., supra note 5, at 27 (noting that some election officials prefer to delay 
adopting technology “until ‘all the bugs have been worked out’”); Levitt, supra note 6, at 486 (not-
ing that when technology fails, the resulting problems can be very serious). 
 144.  See ADONA ET AL., supra note 5, at 19; Lin et al., supra note 93, at 18 (discussing attacks 
on voting systems in 2016 elections). 
 145.  Cost includes the cost of training poll workers to use the new technology.  See ADONA ET 
AL., supra note 5, at 5, 29 (“[Local election officials] articulated, in their words, the need to increase 
funding and resources, especially staff and poll workers, new technology, and training.”).   
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desire to run elections on the cheap should not immunize it from its constitu-
tional obligations.146 
Some may argue that if technology truly eliminates any reason for the 
state to retain the law at issue, a court could reach the same conclusion re-
garding the law’s validity under the Anderson/Burdick balancing test as un-
der strict scrutiny.  However, given how easily a balancing test may be met 
with appeals to administrative convenience, a court is much more likely to 
find that a law survives a balancing test than strict scrutiny.147  As important, 
the specter of strict scrutiny may change a jurisdiction’s mindset regarding 
election law.  Instead of focusing on whether a law is convenient for running 
elections and weighing the equities, the state might begin to focus squarely 
on whether the law is necessary.  In this era of neo-vote suppression, a state’s 
change in attitude may be as important as this Essay’s suggested change in 
doctrine.148 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This Essay suggests technology should drive constitutional doctrine in 
some circumstances.  That might be controversial to some, as it posits that 
the Constitution’s meaning and application may change, even when its lan-
guage does not, in part because of technological advances.149  However, the 
project does not change the Constitution’s meaning or application.  It merely 
explains how strict scrutiny obligates the state to do what it can to protect 
fundamental rights.  As technology advances, technology may eliminate the 
need for some laws that impinge on fundamental rights.  Once all justifica-
tions for such impingement fade, all that remains is the impingement. 
Once technology addresses and solves all of the justifications that un-
dergird a law that impinges on a voter’s ability to cast a ballot, a jurisdiction’s 
decision to retain the law should be deemed a direct and substantial limitation 
on a voter’s right to vote.  If so, the level of scrutiny the jurisdiction’s law 
should face increases.  Rather than merely meeting the Anderson/Burdick 
                                                        
 146.  School funding fights have persisted for decades.  See John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School 
Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the War?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351 (2004).  The same is true of 
prison funding litigation.  See Janice C. Griffith, Judicial Funding and Taxation Mandates: Will 
Missouri v. Jenkins Survive under the New Federalism Restraints?, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 483, 570–71 
(2000) (discussing the role of cost in remedying prison conditions cases). 
 147.  See Karlan, supra note 9, at 140 (noting the Supreme Court’s ratcheting up and ratcheting 
down scrutiny of infringements on the right to vote). 
 148.  See id. at 146 (discussing the “new vote denial”); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: 
Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 718–720 (2006) (dis-
cussing then new practices designed to keep minorities from participating in “the electoral pro-
cess”). 
 149.  This is somewhat different than the Fourth Amendment context because it arguably sug-
gests the application of a different constitutional rule, not merely a different interpretation of the 
same constitutional rule.  
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balancing test, the law would need to survive strict scrutiny.  The switch to 
strict scrutiny would be substantive and symbolic.  It would be a recognition 
that a state’s obligation with respect to the right to vote is to do all it can—
including adopting appropriate technology or jettisoning unnecessary laws—
to make sure those who are eligible to vote can vote in elections.  That is how 
to protect and respect a fundamental right. 
This brief Essay is designed to be a conversation starter, not a conver-
sation ender.  It leaves many questions unanswered.  Some include: How 
proven and reliable should technology be before a court can assert that its use 
would obviate the need for a state’s law?  How long should a state be allowed 
to study emerging technology before its refusal to adopt the technology is 
considered a preference for administrative convenience over the protection 
of the right to vote? What role should the cost of adopting new technology 
play in determining whether a state’s retention of its law should be subject to 
strict scrutiny?  These questions will be explored and resolved in time.  For 
now, this Essay attempts to explain why courts and states should start asking 
these questions about how technology interacts with laws that limit a voter’s 
ability to cast a ballot. 
